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CARRIERs-LIABILITY-INJURY TO PASSENGER-PHYSICAL CONDITION OF'
PASSENGER-CONTRmUTORY NEGLiGENCE.-ST. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. OF TEXAS
V. FERGUSON, 64 S. W. Rep. 797 (Texas).-The railroad company allowed
a car to collide with the train in which the appellee and his wife were seated.
The collision was accompanied with such force that it partially knocked the
appellee's wife from her seat and greatly shocked her, producing within a few
days a premature birth, whereby she was permanently injured in health.
Held, that the company was liable.
The company claimed that the collision would not have injured an ordi-
nary passenger, and the company or its agents had no knowledge of the pas-
senger's condition. Among other cases it cited Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo.
344, 34 Am. Rep. 89, a very similar case, in which the injury was held the
remote result of the negligence. The court expressed its disapproval of this
case, and followed Brown v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 360, 41 Am. Rep. 5z; and
Car Co. v. Dupre, 4 C. C. A. 540, 21 L. R. A. 289. A railway company owes
a duty to persons other than those of ordinary physical condition. They
are presumed to know that persons, old, decrepit, and infirm travel on their
trains, and they must exercise care accordingly, Railway Co. v. Rushing, 69
Texas 3o6.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS-NEBRASKA STATUTE
REGULATING INSURANcE-ANTI-TRUST AcT NIAGARA FIRE INSURANCE CO. V.
CORNELL, Iio Fed. Rep. 816 (Neb.).-The statute defining trusts, declar-
ing them illegal, and all agreements in relation thereto void, in order to pre-
vent combinations between fire insurance companies, declared void all agree-
ments by or between insurance companies relating to the amount of commiss-
ions to be allowed agents, or the names of transacting the business of fire in-
surance. It expressly excepted from its provisions all associations of work-
ingmen. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional.
This statute deprived persons of their liberty in violation of the federal
constitution, which guarantees not merely liberty of the person, but also lib-
erty to make and enforce contracts. In excepting labor unions, it denied the
equal protection of the laws to all persons not members of such organizations.
The Railroad Traffic Association Case, 166 W. S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, was
strongly urged by the defendant as upholding the doctrine of the statute.
The court held that it did not, for the reason that the statute under consid-
eration in that case was an act of Congress, and upheld by reason of the
commerce clause of the constitution, while the statute in this case was a
state statute.
CONTRACTS - PARTIES - KNOWLEDGE - MISREPRESENTAION .- BARcUS V.
DoRaIEs, 71 N. Y., Supp. 695.-Plaintiff, under the name of Committee on
Distribution, through agent, obtained defendant's order for books by falsely
representing that the seller was a committee of Congress and that the books
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could be obtained only on the recommendation of a congressman. Held, that
defendant was not obliged to take the books, even though they were as good
as represented. Williams, J., dissenting.
This question does not seem to have been decided by the New York courts
before, but there are many cases in other jurisdictions sustaining this decision.
The controlling principle is stated in Smelting Co. v. Mining Co., 127 U. S.
387, that every one has a right to select and determine with whom he will
contract and cannot have another person thrust upon him without his consent.
See also Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28.
CoNTRAcTs-PUBLIc POLIcY-PRovisION IN NoTE.-UNIoN CENTRAL LIFE
INS Co. v. CHAMPLIN ET AL., 65 Pac. 836 (Okla.).-A stipulation in a note,
which forbids the maker's discharging his obligation by borrowing money
from anyone except the payee, is contrary to public policy and hence null and
void.
No hard and fast rule may be laid down in determining what contracts
are contrary to public policy. Mr. Story says in his work on Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 546: "Whenever any contract conflicts with the morals of the
time, and contravenes any established interest of society, it is void, as being
against public policy." The test is the evil tendency of the contract and not
its actual injury to the public in a particular instance. Brown v. Columbus
National Bank, 137 Ind. 655; Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147; Firemen's
Association v. Berghaus, 13 La. Ann. 2o9.
COUNTIES-BOARD OF SUPERvISORS.Z-ORDINANCES-SSuBMISSION TO VOTERS
EX-PARTE ANDERSON, 66 Pac. 194 (Cal.).--In accordance with the directions
of the state constitution, the statutes df 1897, Section 2, declares that the pow-
ers of a county can only be exercised by the board of supervisors or their
agents. Held, that Section 13, which provides that any ordinance submitted
by a certain number of legal voters and adopted at the polls shall have the
same force as though ordained by the supervisors, is void. Beatty, C. J.,
dissenting.
The practical effect of the provisions in question would be to establish
two equal, co-ordinate, law-making powers, each existing without any restric-
tions on the other. This would not only be an absurdity and a source of
endless confusion, but plainly inconsistent with our accepted forms of govern-
ment.
FEDERAL JURISDIcTIoN-DIVE sE CITIZENSHIP--CoRPORATIONS-UNITED
STATES v. S. P. ScHOTLER, no Fed. i.-Under act of Congress, March 3,
z887, as amended by Act of Congress, August 13, I888, providing that no
civil suit may be brought against any person outside of the district of which
he is an inhabitant or a resident, a corporation of one state may not be sued
in the Federal Courts of another state, in which it has an usual place of busi-
ness.
The Judicary Act of 1875 provided that a person must be sued in the dis-
trict in which he resided or might "be found" at the time of service of pro-
cess. Under this act it -was generally held that a corporation of one state,
having a place of business and an agent in another state might be sued in the
latter state. Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall 65; Insurance Co. v. French, I8
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Howard 404; Boston Electric Co. v. Electric Gas Lighting Co., 23 Fed. 839;
U. S. v. American Bell Tel. Co., 29 Fed. 17. Under the act of 1887, how-
ever, the Supreme Court holds in Shaw v. Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, On
which the present decision is based, that a corporation of one state is not
an inhabitant or resident of another state in which it has a usual place of busi-
ness. A contrary view is taken in U. S. v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (C. C.) 49
Fed. 297.
EQUITY-RIGHT TO INVOKE JURISDICTION-PROTECTION OF CONTRAcTS ARIs-
ING OUT OF UNLAWFUL ComBINATION.-DELAWARE L. & W. R. Co. v. FRANK,
nio Fed. 689 (N. Y.).-The plaintiff asked for an injunction to enjoin ticket
brokers from dealing in special tickets which were untransferable. It ap-
peared that the plaintiff was a member of a combination formed by a number
of railroads for the purpose of preventing competition, the passenger receipts
of all such railroads being pooled and divided on an agreed basis. Held, that
complainant was not entitled to equitable relief.
The combination formed by the railroads, being in violation of the federal
anti-trust law, was illegal. A federal tribunal cannot be invoked to protect
the issuance of a ticket which is the evidence of an agreement between rail-
road corporations specifically forbidden by an act of Congress, which has been
sustained by the Supreme Court. U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Associa-
tion, i66 U. S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540; U. S. v. Joint Traffic Association, 17i
U. S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct. 25. The complainant contended that the unlawful acts
charged by the defendant did not relate to the subject matter. The court,
however, held that the wrongdoing of the complainant was not remote, in that
it had given birth to the combination whose tickets were wrongfully diverted
by the defendant.
FOREIGN DIVORcE-SuBsTITUTED SERvIcE-DowER-BAR.-STARBUcK v.
STARBUCK ET AL., 71 N. Y. Sup. I94.-Plaintiff, a resident of Massachusetts,
obtained in that state a divorce from her husband, a resident of New York,
who was served personally but who did not appear in the action. Although
the husband married a second time, at his death in 1896, plaintiff brought
action for dower. Held, that the Massachusetts decree was not binding on
plaintiff in New York and hence did not bar her right to dower in husband's
lands in that state.
This decision follows naturally from the strict attitude of the New York
courts upon the question of foreign divorces. Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317;
Van Cleaf v. Burns, 133 N. Y. 540; In re Kimball, 155 N. Y. 62. The court
holds that the plaintiff by this action of dower, strictly speaking, does not
question the validity of her divorce, but only maintains that its -alidity is
confined to the jurisdiction granting it. This conclusion, however, is just
the reverse of that reached in In re Swales Estate, 70 N.Y. Supp. 22o, that where
a party has invoked and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of any court,
he cannot therefore be heard to question such jurisdiction. The weight of
authority in this country is that such a decree dissolves the marriage rela-
tion anxI bars the right to dower. Atherton v. Atherton, I81 U. S. 155.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-PROMISE IN CONSIDERATION OF MARRIAGE-
MARTIAL RIGHTS.-BRINKLEY V. BRINKLEY ET AL., 39 S. E., 38 (N. C.).-
Where the defendant agreed to deed land to the plaintiff if she would marry
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him, and after her promise to do so, but before marriage cotiveyed the land
without consideration to his children by a former wife, such conveyance,
though recorded before the marriage, was fraudulent and void as against a
deed to plaintiff, made sixteen years subsequently. Clark, J., dissenting.
The above decision is rendered on the grounds that after an agreement
to marry, a secret voluntary conveyance by one party is void, being in fraud
of martial rights. Poston v. Gillespie, 58 N. C. 258; Brown v. Bronson, 35
Mich. 415; Palmer v. Neave, ii Ves. 165. The minority opinion, however,
is well supported by authorities. It seems well settled that a postnuptial set-
tlement in pursuance of an antinuptial parol agreement is a voluntary convey-
ance. Warden v. Jones, 23 Beav. 487; Trowell v. Shenton, 8 Ch. Div. 318
(Eng.); Reade v. Livingstone, 3 Johnson Ch. (N. Y.) 481; Smith v. Greer,
3 Humphrey (Tenn.) 118. Decisions in the United States go still further,
and are almost unanimous in holding that a voluntary conveyance is valid as
against subsequent purchasers with notice. Chaffin v. Kimball, 23 Ill. 36;
Jackson v. Tower, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 599; Lancaster v. Dolan, i Rawle (Pa.)
231.
INSURAzcE-PoLIcy-CxsTRUCTIoN-ToTAL Loss.-DEvTr v. PRoVIDEN-E-
WASHINGTON INS. Co., 7o N. Y. Supp. 6 54.-Defendant insured a cargo of
produce "free of particular average." The boat was sunk, but part of cargo
was saved and sent to port of destination in a damaged condition where, on
sale, it brought only one-fourth of whole value when insured. Held, to be
a constructive total loss for which insurer was liable.
The tendency of both American and English courts seems to be away
from the theory that there must be a physical destruction or loss of identity of
memorandum articles to constitute a total loss. The modern English rule revers-
ing the position of the early case of Cocking v.Frazer,4 Doug. 259, holds insurers
liable for a total loss of value although articles remain in specie. Rosetto v.
Gurney, ii C. B. 186. The prinipal case following Wallerstein v. Ins. Co.,
44 N. Y. 204, goes even further by holding that the American rule that a
damage exceeding fifty per cent. constitutes a constructive total loss, applies
to memorandum articles. In Kettle v. Ins. Co., io Gray 144, the Massachusetts
court refused to decide the point, although expressing its opinion that the
fifty per cent. rule ought to apply. To the same conclusion is Poole v. Ins.
Co., 14 Conn. 47. Yet the ruling of Wallerstein v. Ins. Co. was hardly in
line with the early New York decisions; Leroy v. Gouvernuer, i Johns. 226;
DePeyster v.Ins. Co., 19 N. Y.272; and does not seem since to have been regarded
as controlling. Carr v. Ins. Co., iog N. Y. 5o4- The U. S. Supreme Court
in a recent case holds a contrary rule that the exception of particular average
upon memorandum articles excludes a constructive total loss. Washburn Mfg.
Co. v. Ins. Co., 179 U. S. I.
INTERSTATE CoMMERcE - STATE LEGISLATIoN, AFFECTING- PROH-IBITING
SALE OF GAME OR FISH.-IN RE DEININGER, io8 Fed. 623.-Game laws of
Oregon make it a penal olfense for a person to have trout in his possession
for sale. Held, to be a valid police regulation and not an unlawful interfer-
ence with interstate commerce, although such trout are brought from another
state, where they are lawfully caught.
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The right of a state to forbid the sale of game killed within its borders
is unquestioned. Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 331; but the state courts, and by
this decision the Circuit Courts also, are divided as to whether sale of game
brought into the state can be prohibited. Com. v. Wilkinson, 139 Pa. St. 298;
Ex-parte Maier, io3 Cal. 476; State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393. In Geer v.
Conn., I6I U. S. 519, the right to take game out of the state for sale, contrary
to statute, was denied on the ground that game is not property. The princi-
pal case upon the same ground denies the right to bring it within the state for
sale contrary to statute. Game coming within the state is to be regarded as
becoming at once game of that state. The ruling is further justified in that
the enforcement of local game laws is rendered practicable by making every
possession unlawful. An opposite conclusion is reached by In re Davenport,
1o4 Fed. 54o, which holds that the prohibition is a mere rule of convenience
and not a legitimate exercise of the state's police power, and consequently
an interference with inter-state commerce.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-VAuLTS UNDER SIDEWALKS-PERMISSION OF
CITY-ORDINARY CARE-LABILiTY OF TENANT.-WEST CHICAGO MASONIC
ASSOCIATION v. COHN, 6I N. E. 439 (Ill.)-A portion of certain premises was
leased, the tenant to keep the demised premises and appurtenances in good
repair. This portion contained a vault under the sidewalk, from which a
coal hole opened, these having been constructed with the permission of the
city. The vault had no connection with any part of the building not leased
to this tenant and the latter was entitled, as against the owner, to the exclus-
ive control and possession of this portion. Held, that the tenant and not the
owner of the premises, was liable to a foot passenger for injuries .received
on the sidewalk in consequence of failure to properly cover the coal hole.
The coal hole was not a nuisance, since permission for its construction
had been given by the city. The theory that where such a license is obtained
from the city, the liability for all injuries received therefrom continues with
the owner on the ground of public policy until he has given up control of the
entire building is denied. A similar view is taken in Boston v. Grey et al.,
144 Mass. 53. On the other hand, the New York court holds that in such
a case, the landlord is not relieved of liability by a lease of anything less than
the entire premises; the lease of a part, even though the structure in question
is for the sole benefit of that part, is not sufficient. Trustees v. Foster, i65
N. Y. 354, 5o N. E. 971, 41 L. R. A. 554, 66 Am. St. Rep. 575.
MINES AND MINING-FINDING GoLD--MASTER AND SERVANT.-BURNS V.
CLARK Er AL., 66 Pac. 12 (Cal.).-The plaintiff, while working for the de-
fendants in digging and leveling off a grade for a mill site on government
land, discovered and took possession of some gold: defendants took the same
fromthe plaintiff. The occupancy of this mill site by defendants was not
with the intent to acquire the ownership of the land. Held, that the gold did
not belong to the defendants.
The relation of master and servant in nowise affects the rights of the
finder of lost property. Bow'en v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 281; Tatum v. Sharpless,
6 Phile. 2o; Ellery v. Cunningham, I Met. 112. As affecting the finding itself,
the place of finding is entirely immaterial. Boa en v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 281;
Bridges v. Hawkesworth, z5 Jur. io79. By analogy the same rules seem to
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be applied to the finding of gold, which is not "lost" property, when such
gold was found not by virtue of the servant's employment but by mere acci-
dent.
MuNicIPAL CoRpoRAiNs-PoucE PowERs-Diso0m.Vny HOUSES-MIS-
DEMEANOR-TRIAL BY JURY.-OGDEN V. CITY OF MADISON, 87 N. W. 568 (Wis.).
-Francis Ogden was convicted of keeping a disorderly house in violation cf
an ordinance of the City of Madison. He was tried in the municipal court
without jury, in accordance with the ordinance, and from this he appealed.
Held, that such trial was not in violation of the state and United States Con-
stitution.
The court reasons that the offense here charged is entirely distinct from
the common law misdemeanor of keeping a disorderly house, which is an
offense against a different sovereignty and it is for this latter alone that the
state guarantees a trial by jury. This doctrine is by no means settled, many
courts holding that where there is both a state and a municipal law as to the
same thing, conviction under one would be a bar to the other, and if this
theory, which certainly seems sound, is to be accepted, it follows that the
constitution applies to both. State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; State v. Municipal
Court, 8g Wis. 358, 6i N. W. uoo.
NEGLIGENCE-CHILDREN-TREsPASSER---LICENSE OR INVITATiON-ATTRACT-
iVE MACHINERY.-RYAN v. TowAR, 87 N. W. (Mich.) 644.-Action for per-
sonal injuries. Judgment for defendant. Appeal. Affirrmed. The plaintiff,
a girl between 12 and 13 years old, and her younger sister went onto the land
of the defendant. On the premises was a house containing a disused overshot
wheel. Plaintiff's little sister, while playing with the wheel, got caught
between the wheel and the wheel pit, and the plaintiff while rescuing her,
became injured. Defendants had never taken any particular steps to stop
children -from coming onto their premises. Held, since plaintiff was a tres-
passer, defendant owed no duty to her and trial court was correct in directing
a verdict for the defendant. Montgomery, C. J., and Moore, J., dissenting.
This question has not been decided before in Michigan. The rule was
laid down in the Turn Table Cases (Ry. v. Stout, I7 Wal. 657) by the United
States Court, that where one leaves a dangerous machine exposed so as to
tempt children to play with it, it is an implied invitation and owner is liable,
has in the present case been repudiated.
Michigan is not alone in taking the other view, in fact several states have
refused to follow it. But Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 5o7, cited the Stout
Case, supra, and strongly hinted that should the question arise it would follow
the federal doctrine. The opinion is an excellent digest of the law on the
subject.
NUiSANCE-COMmoN NUISANhcE-ABATEMENT.-STATE V. STARK, 66 Pac.
243 (Kan.).-On Feb. i, igoi, in the city of Topeka, the appellant, with
Carrie Nation and six others, broke into and injured a billiard hall in connec-
tion with which intoxicating liquors were sold. By statute, all places where
intoxicating- liquors are sold or kept for sale are declared to be common
nuisances. The court held, however, that this fact does not justify their-
abatement by any person or persons without process of law.
